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Abstract
Numerous studies have demonstrated that theoretically equivalent measures ofpreference,
such as choices and prices, can lead to systematically different preference orderings, known as
preference reversals. Two major causes of preference reversals are the compatibility effect and
the prominence effect. The present studies demonstrate that the combined effects of prominence
and compatibility lead to predictable preference reversals in settings where improvements in air
quality are compared with improvements in consumer commodities by two methods—willingness
to pay for each improvement and choice (For which of the two improvements would you pay
more?; Which improvement is more valuable to you?). Willingness to pay leads to relatively
greater preference for improved commodities; choice leads to relatively greater preference for
improved air quality. These results extend the domain of preference reversals and pose a
challenge to traditional theories of preference. At the applied level, these findings indicate the
need to develop new methods for valuing environmental resources.
Key words: Preference reversals, environmental values, compatibility effect,
prominence effect, contingent valuation
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Preference Reversals and the Measurement of Environmental Values
The powerful impacts on the natural environment resulting from human actions have
stimulated much interest in methods for measuring environmental resources and changes in those
resources. The principal approach for assessing environmental values has been the contingent
valuation (CV) method, most especially the technique called Willingness to Pay (WTP), which
posits a hypothetical market for an unpriced good and asks individuals to state the dollar value
they are willing to pay for a proposed change in its quantity or quality.
Development of the CV concept has been documented in several recent reviews,
including Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze (1986) and Mitchell and Carson (1989). The
approach is now widely used to value a diverse group of goods whose quantity or quality might
be affected by the decisions of a public agency or private developer. Recent studies, for
example, use WTP to value a wide range of goods such as improved air quality (Irwin, Schenk,
McClelland, Schulze, Stewart, & Thayer, 1990), groundwater (Mitchell & Carson, 1989), and
forest wildlife resources (Walsh et al., 1990).
Despite its widespread use, much has been written about problems with the contingent
valuation approach: it captures attitudinal intentions rather than behavior (Azjen & Peterson,
1988), it is difficult to make CV scenarios comprehensive and meaningful (Fischhoff & Furby,
1988), and its results are susceptible to influence from numerous cognitive and contextual biases
(Brown & Slovic, 1988).
Contextual influences have proven to be particularly important in the measurement of
personal values. Extensive research in human judgment and decision making indicates that
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people often do not hold values that are well-defined in monetary units. Unless the items being
valued are simple and familiar-and most environmental goods are neither-individuals will
construct values during the elicitation process, based on the context that is provided (see, e.g.,
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, in press).
The constructive nature of preference can be appreciated by examining the phenomenon
of preference reversal, which has been studied by psychologists and economists for more than
20 years (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983; Tversky, Slovic & Kahneman, 1990). Numerous
empirical studies have demonstrated that measures of preference systematically violate the
fundamental principle of procedure invariance. According to this principle, different (but
equivalent) measures for eliciting preferences should lead to the same preference ordering, just
as different but equivalent measures of heaviness—e.g., placing two objects on opposite sides
of a pan balance to see which is heavier vs. measuring each object separately on a scale—should
yield the same ordering of weight. Whereas proper physical measures almost always satisfy
procedure invariance, preference measures do not. Object A may be clearly preferred over
Object B under one method of measurement while B is clearly preferred under a different but
presumably equivalent measurement procedure. This fact, we propose, has significant
implications for the valuation of environmental resources.
Failures of procedure invariance have several causes. Two major causes are the
compatibility effect (Slovic, Griffin & Tversky, 1990) and the prominence effect (Tversky,
Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). The compatibility effect implies that, when dollars are an available
(recognizable) attribute of an object, they carry more weight or influence in determining an
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evaluative response that is also in dollars (e.g., willingness to pay, cash equivalent, selling price)
than they do in determining a response that is not in dollars (e.g., a rating of value or a choice).
The prominence effect causes choice responses to be more dominated by prominent
attributes than are pricing responses. This arises from the fact that choices are driven by reasons
and arguments to a greater extent than are pricing responses. Prominent attributes tend to form
the bases for compelling reasons or arguments.
The most common demonstration of these two effects has occurred in the evaluation of
simple gambles such as the following:
Gamble A: .9 win $8
Gamble B: .2 win $30
The evaluator is asked to give minimum selling prices for each gamble and to choose one to
play.
Gamble B tends to elicit a higher selling price or cash equivalent than does Gamble A,
because the pricing response gives greater weight to payoffs (compatibility effect) on which B
is much superior.1 However, the choice mode invokes reasoning in which probability is
prominent ("Gamble A is better because it has such a high probability of winning"). As a result,
most people choose to play Gamble A over Gamble B and a high proportion (40-50%) of the
total sample assign a higher price to B but assert that they would choose to play Gamble A, thus
exhibiting a preference reversal. Reversals in the opposite direction (choose B but place a
higher price on A) rarely occur.
Preference reversals due to compatibility and prominence have been demonstrated with
many other stimuli besides gambles (Slovic et al., 1990; Tversky et al., 1988). Reversals
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induced by changes in response mode have begun to appear in studies of contingent valuation
as well. Brown (1984) examined dollar and rating responses of subjects' WTP for
environmental amenities (air quality and forest scenic quality) and commodities (cameras, cars,
stereos, and bicycles). Most subjects were willing to pay more for the commodities than for the
amenities when giving their answers in dollars, but most rated their willingness to pay for the
amenities higher than their willingness to pay for the commodities. Magat, Viscusi, and Huber
(1988) found that people's values for reducing the risks from chemical products were higher
when they were given paired comparisons (i.e., choices) than when they were asked to provide
WTP values.
The present studies test the hypothesis that the combined effects of prominence and
compatibility will lead to preference reversals in contingent valuation settings where dollar
measures of WTP are compared to values obtained by choice responses.
Consider, for example, evaluations of upgrades or improvements in consumer goods,
such as a better camera, a better TV set, or a better word processor. Compare these upgrades
with improvements in the environment (e.g., cleaner air; prevention of oil spills). We expect
WTP responses to make upgrades in consumer goods appear relatively more preferred than
upgrades in environmental quality. This is because upgraded commodities are clearly more
expensive than the originalcommodities and thisprice differential, though notpresentedand thus
not known precisely by the respondents, would be expected (by compatibility) to serve as a cue
for the WTP responses. Environmental improvements however, provide no price experience or
cues on which to base a monetary WTP response.
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On the other hand, we would expect the direct comparison of value by means of a choice
response (e.g., "for which upgrade would you be willing to pay more?") to favor an
environmental quality improvement because choice invokes arguments and there are many
powerful, even noble, arguments in favor of one's placing high personal value on improved
environmental quality. Arguments for the value of a better word processor, while meaningful,
can hardly compare in importance to the need for a cleaner environment.
In addition to prominence and compatibility effects, there are other reasons to expect that
preference orderings for environmental changes might differ according to whether people are
giving WTP values or choices. Most environmental commodities are public, meaning that there
is a tendency for people to attempt to take a "free ride." In such situations people may give a
WTP value that does not match their highest value for the commodity, but rather represents the
lowest value that they think they can offer and still receive the good. There are enough
examples of this behavior in the market that people may have learned to consider underpaying
for public goods; people who underpay taxes still drive on public roads, attend public schools,
and so on. Related to "free ride" behavior is "protest" behavior. People often do not
understand that environmental improvements may lead to increased prices for goods, they may
believe that it is neither their duty nor their responsibility to pay for environmental damage
created by others, or they may mistrust organizations in general and not want to give money to
someone in charge of cleaning up the environment. To register their anger, they report a zero
WTP which does not reflect their actual value for the environmental change. In WTP situations,
both "free riders" and "protestors" underrepresent their values for environmental improvements
because they believe someone else will or should pay for the improvements. This
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underrepresentation means that environmental goods will appear to be less preferred than they
actually are, resulting in less relative preference for environmental goods in WTP than in choice.
To test whether preferences for environmental improvements depend on whether people
are providing WTP values or choosing, our first two studies presented people with three trades.
One of the trades was for a specified improvement in air quality, and the other two trades were
for everyday market commodities. Each trade was presented pictorially and described
specifically, so that subjects were clear about exactly what they were valuing (Fischhoff &
Furby, 1988). About half the subjects provided WTP values for the trades; the others made
choices between pairs of trades. In these between-subject studies, in which no one person is
presented with both response modes (WTP and choice), preference reversals cannot be shown
directly, but must be inferred. Under the assumption of random assignment of subjects to the
two response-mode conditions, we will infer the existence of preference reversals from a finding
that the choice mode yields a significantly higher proportion of preferences for the air quality
trade.
Our third study used a within-subjects design: all subjects provided WTP and choice for
an air quality improvement and a commodity improvement. Here we can directly observe the
frequency of preference reversals as predicted by the prominence and compatibility effects as
well as look for preference reversals in the opposition direction (unpredicted reversals).
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Study 1
Method
Subjects. Four hundred surveys were mailed (200 of each version) to Denver Metro
Area residents randomly selected by a professional survey corporation.2 There were 61 bad
addresses, 36 for the WTP version and 25 for the choice version. Of the remainder, 74 percent
(122) of the WTP version and 72 percent (126) of the choice version were returned.
Procedure. All survey booklets started with descriptions and questions about Denver's
"Brown Cloud," the air pollution so noticeable over Denver, particularly in winter. Respondents
rated photos of various levels of air quality for several Denver area scenes and expressed their
concern about the visibility and healthiness of Denver's air. Following this section, all subjects
were asked to evaluate three trades: from worse air quality to better, from a worse camera to
a better one, and from a worse TV set to a better one. The air quality trade was presented with
color photographs of two actual winter days in Denver, taken from the same location. One
showed the "Brown Cloud"; the other was clearer. Black and white photographs of two
cameras, with lists of their features, and of two TV sets with lists of features, described the
commodities trades.
For each trade, respondents in the WTP condition were asked their WTP, starting with
the cameras, then the TV sets and finally the air quality. The camera question was worded as
follows:
Now suppose you own a new camera like the one shown in Picture 1A. Would
your household be willing to trade it for a new camera as shown in Picture IB,
if you also had to pay some extra money in the trade?
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NO - WHY?
YES - What is the MOST your household would be willing to pay to
trade in the camera in picture 1A for the camera in picture IB? $
The TV set question was the same. The air quality question said,
Now please compare photographs 3A and 3B. They are both pictures of a winter
day. One of them shows a greater amount of visible pollution than the other.
Suppose 3A depicts the amount of pollution that you live with most days of the
winter.
Would you be willing to pay higher prices (for example, gasoline prices)
to improve overall air quality-so that your average winter day improves from
being like Picture 3A to being like Picture 3B?
NO - WHY?
YES - What is the MOST your household would be willing to pay
EACH YEAR, in higher prices, to fund the improvement in average winter-day
air quality from that shown in picture 3A to that shown in picture 3B? $
Respondents in the choice condition were first asked to choose between improved air
quality and an improved camera. Then they chose between improved air quality and an
improved TV set. After the air quality trade and the camera trade were described, the
instructions said,
Now suppose you own a new camera like the one shown in Picture 2A. Suppose
you could trade it for a new camera as shown in Picture 2B. This improvement
would probably cost you money.
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In answering the next question, think about the value your household
would place on a year's improvement in air quality (both health and visibility) as
represented by going from Picture 1A to Picture IB for the average winter day.
DO NOT consider the value such an improvement would have to OTHER
PEOPLE. Compare the MOST your household would be willing to pay for this
improvement for ONE YEAR, in higher prices, with the MOST your household
would be willing to pay to trade in camera 2A for camera 2B.
Which improvement would your household be willing to pay MORE for?
More for one year's improvement in air quality, from Picture 1A
to Picture IB.
The same.
More for the improvement in cameras, from Picture 2A to Picture
2B.
The questionasking for a choice between the air quality trade and the TV set trade was similarly
worded.
Results
WTP values were converted into imputed choices based on the ordering of subjects'
dollar values. If subjects in the WTP conditions circled "NO" when they were asked if they
would pay for the trade, they were assigned a zero for their WTP value for that trade. If they
did not provide a value for the WTP question (i.e., they neither circled "NO" nor gave a value)
the datum was considered missing and excluded from the analyses. The resulting choice data
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are shown in Table 1. Chi-squares were computed using a log-linear regression, so that main
effect as well as interaction tests could be performed on the same data.
Insert Table 1 about here
A large majority of respondents preferred the air quality improvement over the
commodity improvement; across bothresponse modes (x2 (1) = 29.18, n = 153, p < .001 for
TV set/air quality and x2 (1) = 51.45 , n = 163, p < .001 for camera/air quality). Only 17
percent (excluding ties) preferred the camera trade and 28 percent preferred the TV set trade
when each was compared with the air quality improvement. Further evidence for the greater
attractiveness of the air quality improvement is seen in the mean WTP values: $164.97 for air
quality, $67.06 for the camera trade, and $116.10 for the TV set trade. This predominance of
preference for the air quality trade suggests that preference reversals are less likely to be found
because preference reversals are most common when the two alternatives are approximately
equally attractive.
Nevertheless, response mode did have a significant effect on preference in the predicted
direction. Preference for the air quality improvement was significantly more frequent with the
choice mode than with the WTP mode: 92 percent versus 71 percent for air quality over
camera; 83 percent versus 60percent for air quality versus TV set (ties excluded; the x2 values
are given in Table 1). Although these effects are significant, the magnitude of the effects, as
measured by Cramer's V-statistic,3 are fairly low (see Table 1). Inclusion of ties in the
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analyses did not appreciably change the results. Thus from these data one can infer a
statistically significant but modest occurrence of preference reversals.
One way to test for free ride or protest behavior is to look at the number of zero WTP
values. If enough people gave zero WTP values for air quality and not for the other
commodities, then we would observe data like those in Table 1. In Study 1, 23 (22%) people
gave zero values for the air quality trade, 31 (32%) for the camera trade, and 32 (33%) for the
TV set trade. Almost half of these zero WTP's came from 11 respondents who reported zero
for all three WTP questions. Not surprisingly, this even distribution of zero WTP values did
not affect the direction of the preference reversal effect, although the reduction in sample size
resulted in a nonsignificanteffect for the air quality/TV set comparison. The air quality/camera
comparison remained significant when zeros were excluded.
Discussion
Study 1 demonstrates thatpeople'spreference orderings depend on response mode. This
effect does not appear to be a result of free rides or protests, because it is impervious to the
exclusion of zero WTP values. The overall preference for air quality, however, was so
pervasive that it is difficult to see to what extent preferences can reverse. In Study 2 we
presented people with more enticing market commodities trades in order to achieve a better
balance of attractiveness.
Our theoretical bases for predicting preference reversals in the present studies are: (a)
The compatibility effect will lead to an elevation of WTP for market commodity trades relative
to WTP for the air quality trade and (b) the prominence effect will increase the attractiveness,
in choice, of the air quality trade. This theory predicts that no evidence of preference reversal
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will be found when the two market commodity trades are paired. To test this prediction, the
choice-modesubjects in Study 2 were asked to choose between the two market commoditytrades
as well as between each market commodity trade and the air quality trade. Also, in Study 1 all
subjects in the WTP condition were presented with the two market commodity trades before the
air quality trade. In Study 2 this order was varied to test for an order effect.
Study 2 used a different subject population from that used in Study 1. The subjects in
Study 1 were Denver area home owners; the subjects in Study 2 were Boulder area students.
This change provides a test of the robustness of our results; if Study 2 subjects show the same
preference reversals as did subjects in Study 1, we can be more confident that preference
reversals of this kind are likely to occur in many valuation situations.
Study 2
Method
Subjects. Forty-seven University of Colorado undergraduates participated in the
experiment as part of a class requirement.
Materials. The subjects were presented with the same air quality trade, using the same
color photographs as in Study 1. Two new commodity trades were used, a TV set without a
VCR traded for the same TV set with a VCR and a computer system without a printer traded
for the same system with a printer. These commodities were chosen on the basis of WTP data
for commodities presented in another set of experiments (Irwin, 1991). Both the commodity
trades were presented via pictures with lists of features.
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The instructions were the same as in Study 1, suitably altered for the new commodity
trades, but there was no lengthy initial section describing and asking about Denver's "Brown
Cloud."
Half of the WTP subjects received the air quality question first; the others received it
last.
Results
The bottom half of Table 1 presents the results for Study 2. There was no effect due to
order of presentation in the WTP condition; the data from the two orders are combined in Table
1.
There was no strong overall preference for the air quality improvement over the
commodity improvements (x2 (1) = .52, n = 41, n.s. for printer/air quality; x2 (1) =-03, n =
40, n.s. for V.C.R./air quality). Across both response modes, 55% indicated a preference for
air quality over the printer; 48% for air quality over the VCR (ties excluded). In the WTP
condition the mean responses were $156.74 for the printer trade, $162.70 for the VCR trade,
and $92.74 for the air quality trade. A comparison of WTP values for the air quality trade in
Study 1 versus Study 2 showed no significant difference in WTP, either when including or
excluding zero WTP's (t (143) = .87, n.s. for all WTP, t (102) = 1.67, n.s. for positive WTP).
The data from Study 2 showed a strong response mode effect, indicative of preference
reversals. As Table 1 indicates, the magnitude of this effect is roughly double that of Study 1.
For the choice mode, air quality improvement was preferred by 81 percent of the subjects over
the printer trade and by 74 percent over the VCR trade (ties excluded). In striking contrast, for
the WTP mode, the commodities were preferred: 71 percent of the subjects reported a larger
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WTP for the printer and 76 percent for the VCR over the air quality improvement (ties
excluded). Inclusion of ties in the analysis did not appreciably change the significance or
magnitude of these differences.
As the bottom part of Table 1 shows, there was no effect of response mode on preference
when the two commodities were compared with each other.
As in Study 1, there was a fairly even distribution of zero WTP values among the trades:
four for the printer trade, one for the VCR trade, and two for the air quality trade. Again,
exclusion of these zero WTP values did not appreciably change the results.
Discussion
Study 2 successfully replicated the preference reversals of Study 1, but showed an even
stronger effect of the response mode manipulation because overall preference for the air quality
trade was eliminated. As with Study 1, it is clear that free ride or protest behavior did not
produce the results, because elimination of zero WTP's did not change the analyses. As
predicted, no preference differences were found in comparisons involving the two market
commodity trades.
The switch in respondents from Denver home owners to Boulder students did not seem
to affect the results. There was no significant effect of subject population on WTP values for
air quality, whether zero WTP's were included or not. There were proportionately fewer zero
WTP's in Study 2 than in Study 1, but this difference is understandable given that Study 1 was
a mail-in survey.
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Study 3
Study 3 was conducted to determine whether preference reversals would occur within the
same individual, evaluating commodity and air quality improvements under both WTP and
choice response modes.
Method
Subjects. Ninety-two young adults who responded to an ad in the University of Oregon
newspaper were paid for their participation in the study.
Procedures. The format of Study 3 was the same as that of Studies 1 and 2 with the
following changes: First, there was only one pair of commodities, an electronic typewriter to
be traded for a laptop personal word-processing system. Pictures of both commodities were
shown to the subjects. The electronic typewriter was described as having a 7000 character
memory, a 16 character display, and a 50,000 word spell checker. The personal word processor
was described as " . . . much more advanced. It has a 16 line by 80 character display, a 50,000
character internal memory, a 100,000 character data disk capacity, a 90,000 word spell checker,
a printer, and many other features."
The air quality trade was the same as in Studies 1 and 2, using the same color
photographs (but the Denver location was not mentioned). WTP was elicited first for the word-
processing system, then for the improved air quality.
The wording of the choice question was changed. In Studies 1 and 2, the subjects were
asked, "Which improvement would your household be willing to pay MORE for?" In Study 3
the choice instructions were:
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Think about the difference in value to you between the typewriter and the word
processor and the difference in value to you between the two levels of air quality.
Refer to the pictures if you wish.
Which difference in value is greater for you? (Check one.)
1. The improvement in air quality for one year from Picture
A to Picture B is greater in value for me personally than
the typewriter-word processor difference.
2. Both differences are equal for me.
3. The difference between the electronic typewriter and the
word processor is greater in value for me personally than
the air quality difference.
The final difference was that each subject provided both WTP and choice responses. The
two WTP responses always preceded the choice.
Results
Table 2 provides the results from Study 3. The improvement in air quality was valued
more highly in 86% of the direct choices but in only 40% of the choices inferred from WTP
responses (ties excluded). There were 71 subjects who made a choice and two unequal WTP
responses (after excluding subjects with any ties or missing values). Of these, 29 (41%)
reversed their preferences in the predicted direction by choosing the air quality improvement as
having greater value to them personally and indicating a higher WTP value for the better word-
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processing system. None of these 71 subjects exhibited an unpredicted reversal (choosing the
word-processing system but assigning greater WTP to the air quality improvement).
Insert Table 2 about here
Discussion
With a different sample of subjects, a different pair of commodities, and a slightly
different choice question, Study 3 replicated the results of Studies 1 and 2. Most importantly,
in Study 3, because of its within-subject design, direct observations of preference reversals could
be made. Predicted reversals were common; unpredicted reversals did not occur.
General Discussion
The present study demonstrates a new kind of preference reversal, predictable from the
heuristics and choice strategies that have produced reversals in simple gambles, but taking place
within a very different domains of preferences. As with other violations of procedure
invariance, the reversals of preference between environmental and non-environmental
commodities shown here pose a serious challenge to theoretical conceptions of preference and
choice. As Tversky et al. (1988) observed:
In the classical analysis, the relation of preference is inferred from observed
responses and is assumed to reflect the decision maker's underlying utility or
value. But if different elicitation procedures produce different ordering of
options, how can preferences and values be defined? And in what sense do they
exist? (p. 383).
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This state of theoretical uncertainty coupled with the psychological concept of
constructed preferences points to the need for a new approach to eliciting values for
environmental resources. If, as preference reversal studies suggest, values are constructed
during the elicitation process in a rather unconscious way that is strongly determined by
context, why not take a deliberate approach to value construction in a manner designed to
rationalize the process? Following this line of thought, Gregory, Lichtenstein, and Slovic
(1991) have proposed that explicit value-structuring techniques based on multiattribute utility
theory be used as a contingent-valuation method to develop psychologically and morally
defensible measures of environmental values. This approach is sensitive to the
multidimensionality of environmental goods and the need to help people think about and
integrate these values in a coherent manner. It thus views the CV approach as a kind of
tutorial, building the monetary value as it elicits it. In this sense a CV survey becomes an
active process of value construction, rather than a neutral process of value discovery.
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Footnotes
1. The compatibility effect can be produced by a number of different cognitive
mechanisms. One such mechanism is anchoring and adjustment (Schkade & Johnson, 1987;
Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968). Respondents may construct a price by starting with the amount
to win and adjusting it downward in light of the less than perfect chance of winning.
2. Study 1 was part of a large contingent valuation survey project, with six other
versions besides the two described here. The results from the other six versions have been
reported by Irwin et al. (1990).
3. While x2 tests the reliability of an effect, Cramer's V provides a measure of the
magnitude of that effect. Like most measures of magnitude of effect, Cramer's V ranges from
0 to 1.0, and higher values indicate that more variance has been explained (i.e., that the effect
is larger).
Table 1.
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Response Frequencies in Studies 1 and 2.
Response Mode
Choice WTP
Effect of Response Mode on
Preference (Ties Excluded)
STUDY 1
Air Quality Preferred
Camera Preferred
Ties
Missing Data
Total
X2 = 11.7/n = 163,p<.0001
Magnitude of Effect (V) = .28
91 45
8 19
24
3
126
26
32
122
Air Quality Preferred
T.V. Preferred
Ties
Missing Data
Total
STUDY 2
76 38
16 23
30
4
0
61
126 122
X2 = 7.67, n = 153, p < .005
Magnitude of Effect (V) = .23
Air Quality Preferred 17 6 X2 = 11.6,n = 42,p<.001
Printer Preferred 4 15 Magnitude of Effect (V) = .53
Ties
Missing Data
3
0
2
0
Total 24 23
Air Quality Preferred 14 5 X2 = 10.0, n = 40, p < .002
V.C.R. Preferred 5 16 Magnitude of Effect (V) = .50
Ties
Missing Data
5
0
2
0
Total 24 23
Printer Preferred 10 9 X2 = .ll, n=38, n.s.
V.C.R. Preferred 9 10
Ties
Missing Data
5
0
4
0
Total 24 23
WTP Favored:
Air Quality
Computer
Tied
Missing Data
Total
Irwin et al. / 27
Table 2
Choice Favored
Air Quality Computer Tied Total
31 0 0 31
29 11 6 46
7 1 1 9
6 0 0 6
73 12 7 92
Predicted Reversals: 29/71 =41%
Unpredicted Reversals: 0/71 = 0%
